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I. Introduction 
Costa Rica experienced a major economic crisis during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. In order to overcome this crisis, a 
stabilization program was adopted by the authorities which, among 
other things, attempted to restructure the policies and opera-
tions of the Nationalized Banking System {NBS). 
The NBS had virtually become an obstacle to the reactivation 
of the economy. This reflected, in part, an increasing number of 
restrictions on its operations, imposed by the Central Bank and 
by special legislation. After the appointment of Dr. Eduardo 
Lizano as Executive President of the Central Bank, however, a 
process of liberalization of the financial system was attempted. 
This process has mainly consisted of a gradual reduction in the 
use of quantitative restrictions on credit {topes de cartera), 
until their virtual disappearance in 1987. Liberalization has 
also been aimed at giving greater independence to the commercial 
banks in the setting of their interest-rate structure. The scope 
of subsidies through the credit channels has also been specif i-
cally defined and limited. 
The Central Bank's strategy has been, therefore, to let the 
state-owned banks operate with less restrictions than before and 
to let them simulate more what a private financial institution 
would do; that is, to efficiently transfer resources from surplus 
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to deficit economic units, thus promoting the most profitable use 
of those resources. 
As a result of the new strategy, however, certain groups in 
the economy, which had been heavily subsidized under the earlier 
regime, reacted alarmed. They saw their possibilities to obtain 
low interest rates and large loans (via tapes and avios) greatly 
diminished. They feared that the state-owned banks would reduce 
their lending to the high-risk, low-profitability activities 
which were being subsidized. 
For several reasons, from both the demand and the supply 
side, the volume of agricultural credit, specially for small 
farmers, had recently declined. This situation, coupled with the 
drought experienced in the Guanacaste region during four of the 
past five years, as well as the decline of the international and 
domestic price of meat, aggravated the crisis of the agricultural 
sector, in general, and specially that of the cattle raisers and 
rice producers of the Guanacaste region. 
In an attempt to restore the benefits and priviledges that 
they had acquired before the crisis, such as interest-rate 
subsidies and easy access to the limited loanable funds avail-
able, cattle raisers and rice producers, with the help of small 
farmers and the rest of the agricultural sector, started to lobby 
for laws that would protect their entitlements to be approved by 
Congress.11 The major achievements of this lobbying was the 
FODEA law. By this legislation, agricultural producers obtained 
a series of benefits, including the rescheduling of delinquent 
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loans and new credit subsidies. 
II. The Political Economy of Agricultural Credit Legislation in 
Congress 
In addition to the FODEA law, several bills, under con-
sideration in Congress in early 1988, will be analyzed in this 
paper. These bills have reflected the attempts by representa-
tives of the agricultural sector to reverse the financial 
liberalization process undertaken by the Central Bank. Most of 
the proposals aspire to go back to the old system of topes and 
interest-rate subsidies, from which some members of the agricul-
tural sector had greatly benefited in the past. 
1- FODEA 
On april 9, 1987, the Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Aqropecua-
rio, popularly known as the "FODEA" law, was approved by Con-
gress. The main purpose of this legislation was to provide 
incentives to the agricultural sector. Its mandates can be 
divided into five major components: 
(a) Debt relief to delinquent agricultural borrowers. 
This authorized the Ministry of Finance to issue 5 billion 
colones in bonds, at an interest rate of 8 percent, and maturing 
in 16 years. These bonds will be used to buy from the state-
owned banks those loans from small and medium farmers granted 
before December 31, 1985 which were delinquent by June 30, 1986. 
The small-farmer loans are being rescheduled for up to 16 
4 
years, with a grace period of 4 years, at an interest rate of a 
percent during the grace period, and at a rate 10 points below 
the basic deposit rate afterwards. Loans of medium-sized 
borrowers are being rescheduled for the same period of time, but 
at a 10 percent interest rate during the first four years, and a 
rate 6 points below the basic deposit rate afterwards. 
Large-borrower loans will not be rescheduled automatically, 
as in the case of small and medium borrowers. They are being 
studied on a case by case basis, since these loans will not be 
bought by the Government. For those large farmers whose loan 
projects are still viable, the rescheduling will be for 12 years, 
with a 4-year grace period, at an interest rate of 15 percent 
during 4 years, and at a rate equivalent to the basic deposit 
rate for the remaining 8 years. If the farmers cannot meet these 
terms, they must surrender part of their property as partial 
payment, until the bank considers that the project is feasible 
again. 
With the 5 billion colones in bonds, the Government will 
only be able to buy the small and medium farmeri;;' delinquent 
portfolio from the state-owned banks. The estimated distribution 
of the portfolio among these banks and by farmer's size can be 
seen in Table 1. 
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Table 1. National Banking System. FODEA's Portfolio 
Distribution, by Banks and Farmer's Size. Amounts in 
millions of colones. 
Stall Mrliun Imm 'lttal 
NJll:er Jl1a.rC % NJd:s: Jl1a.rC % NJd:s: Jltrut % NJd:s: 1Mlnt 
10,461. 706.8 26.5 1,!XB 788.2 29.6 624 1,166.6 43.8 12,~ 2,660.6 
5,344 1,136.9 42.4 574 545.8 20.3 383 988.5 '57.2 6,301 2,681.3 
n.a. 907.3 41.4 n.a. 571.5 26.1 n.a. 713.2 32.5 n.a. 2,192.0 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes: BNCR- Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
BCR- Banco de Costa Rica 
BACR- Banco Anglo Costarricense 
BCAC- Banco Credito Agricola de Cartage 
n.a. n.a. 
Small: Up to 1.5 million colones in total debt. 
n.a. 
Medium: From 1.5 up to 5 million colones in total debt. 
Large: Over 5 million colones in total debt. 
(b) Preferential tax treatment. 
This dimension of FODEA is designed to match the incentives 
available to the industrial sector. These provisions will 
primarily allow farmers to use the accelerated depreciation of 
new fixed assets and to enjoy income-tax credits when reinvesting 
in the same firm, property-tax relief for farm machinery, and 
exemption of import duties on light farm machinery. 
(c) Creation of the Sector Aqropecuario de Recurses Naturales 
Renovables. 
(d) Legislation concernig the Ministry of Agriculture and Lives-
tock (MAG). 
(e) A subsidized interest-rate (i.e, 12 percent) for those 
products classified as aqricultura de cambio. 
(f) An exemption for the state-owned banks to pay the tax from 
296.5 
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the Ley para el Equilibrio Financiero del Sector Publico, which 
was set at 60 million colones for 1987, and had reached 150 
million colones in previous years. 
The FODEA law was enacted unanimously, and it encountered no 
opposition whatsoever in Congress. The discussion was mainly 
related to procedure, especially the way in which the reschedul-
ing of the loans was to be arranged. 
The project originated from an earlier proposal presented by 
the MAG, heavily promoted by the Camara Nacional de Agricultura, 
in which fiscal incentives were the main instrument used to 
balance agricultural protection against that for industry. The 
rationale behind FODEA was that the agricultural sector had been 
heavily taxed and used to subsidize other sectors of the economy. 
Government pol icy had increased the wages of urban workers and 
had lowered food prices, in order to keep urban consumers and 
voters happy, at the expense of rural producers. Thus, it was 
felt necessary to off er the agricultural sector a compensating 
set of incentives. In addition, it was believed that the 
reactivation of the agricultural sector could not take place 
without giving farmers a fresh start. The rescheduling of the 
loans was included in the project as a way to allow farmers to 
become creditworthy again. Due to the bad shape in which farmers 
found themselves, especially cattle and rice producers, who had 
just gone through two consecutive years of drought, the res-
cheduling terms were made easy, in order to allow them a chance 
to recover. 
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It was also argued that the debt relief chapter of the law 
was necessary, since the huge amount of delinquent loans in the 
banks' portfolio was no longer manageable. If the state-owned 
banks were to send all of those farmers to court, in order to 
foreclose or get repayment, either the courts would be overrun 
with these cases indefinitely, or the banks would end up with 
many farms which they would be unable to sell, except at un-
remunerati ve prices. At the same time, agricultural production 
would dramatically decline, creating an enormous economic problem 
for the country. FODEA, thus, was needed as a socio-political 
solution, in order to clean up the banks' delinquent agricultural 
portfolio, and avoid wholesome foreclosures. 
The bill was studied by the Agricultural Commission in 
Congress, chaired by Congressman Jorge Rossi (PLN). Two other 
Commission members were Congressmen representing the Guanacaste 
region, cattle raisers who qualified for the rescheduling of 
loans themselves. Another Congressman who fought hard for this 
project, but outside the Commission, was a former president of 
the Banco Nacional and currently Vice-President of the Federaci6n 
de Camaras de Ganaderos. 
The role of Congressman Rossi was crucial in getting the 
bill approved quickly, even though he did not completely agree 
with the final version of the law. He viewed FODEA as a good 
start in an effort to solve the short-term problems of the 
agricultural sector, but believed that more was needed to solve 
the long-term problems. Actually, almost all Congressmen agreed 
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on this point, but Rossi was the leader who emphasized it the 
most. 
Rossi did not agree on all parts of the project. For 
example, he was dissatisfied with the granting of subsidized 
credit at 12 percent to the items of agricultura de cambio. He 
felt that this was not the way to give incentives to an activity. 
He also recognized the problems and inequity in the generality of 
the rescheduling program, by which some individuals who would had 
been able to but have nevertheless avoided the repaying of their 
loans, through their political connections, were to benefit. He 
argued that this problem came from the extreme politization of 
the state-owned banks, which originated with the "4-3" law of the 
early 1970s, which created a system for the distribution of the 
political pie (power shares) among the parties and ended with the 
autonomy of the banks. 
Congressman Munoz Bustos, former President of the Camara de 
Ganaderos de Guanacaste, claimed that the current condition of 
the farmers (especially cattle raisers) demanded a political 
solution. The social problem of having a lot of bankrupt farmers 
losing their land was considered to be far more important than 
the economic effects that FODEA might have on the banks. He also 
argued, very forcefully, that the cost of credit is too high for 
farmers, due to the high levels of transaction costs for loans 
from the state-owned banks. He felt that farmers cannot absorb 
the present high levels of interest rates. 
Two other large cattle raisers in Congress, Roman and Avila, 
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pushed hard for the law to include all farmers, including large 
farmers, in order to avoid any "discrimination." Avila (PUSC), 
an influential Congressman in bank-related matters, blamed the 
state-owned banks for the crisis affecting cattle raisers. He 
argued that if the banks had carried out the decrees enacted by 
former President Monge, related to the rescheduling of loans, 
then the problem would have been solved. At this moment, he 
claimed, the cattle industry cannot support interest rates any 
higher than 12 percent, and therefore he proposed lower interest 
rates for the rescheduled loans. 
Two Congressmen from Liberaci6n Nacional, who are not on the 
Agricultural Commission, but who are still very influential in 
bank-related matters, are Congressmen Carvajal Herrera and Fait 
Lizano. The former proposed higher interest rates during the 
grace period, and rates tied to the basic deposit rate after-
wards, in order to penalize the banks less. The last part of his 
proposal was approved, but at the lower rate than had been 
initially proposed. Carvajal Herrera had proposed an interest-
rate scheme tied to the deposit rate, especially for large 
farmers, since he argued that the 15 percent rate for the large 
farmers was a big subsidy, and would actually increase land 
concentration in the country. He also felt that the law was too 
general, since it was going to help many people who did not 
deserve these benefits, namely those who had not been paying 
their loans on time, but just waited for this law to be enacted. 
During the discussion of FODEA, the representative of the 
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Federaci6n de camaras de Ganaderos, Alberto Amador, and repre-
sentatives of the small-farmers associations, Union de Aqricul-
tores, UPAGRA, UPANACIONAL, were present in the public stands of 
Congress most of the time, lobbying for its approval .Y The 
cattle raisers, under the leadership of Amador, have .become a 
very powerful group. They campaigned hard for the debt relief 
provisions, arguing that it had to be the first step of any 
successful incentive program for the agricultural sector. The 
rescheduling exercise was considered necessary because of the 
negative impact of bad weather, low international prices, high 
input prices, and excessive indebtness on the cattle industry. 
The small-farmer groups campaigned mostly for the lowering 
of interest rates and for an increased availability of credit. 
They also asked that the loan approval process be streamlined, 
since they had to become eligible for credit as soon as possible, 
before the next crop season. on the other hand, the Camara de 
Aqricultura, which consists mainly of large farmers, campaigned 
on the basis of an equality of incentives with the industrial 
sector and the need for compensatory policies, to offset previous 
measures that had penalized the sector in the past. 
Within the Government, the MAG gave total support to this 
law. Minister Esquivel was one of the main lobbyist. Although 
the Central Bank formally disagreed with the bill, it did not 
actively oppose its approval, contrary to what would have been 
expected. President Lizana declared in Congress that there were 
too many producers in trouble, and that there was, therefore, a 
.· 
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need for a social solution, i.e., a massive rescheduling (adecua-
ci6n al por mayor) , in order to put the banks' portfolio in 
order. The banks are partly at fault, he argued, having given 
too much credit to farmers in the first place. Thus, they should 
absorb part of the losses of the debt relief scheme, because the 
Ministry of Finance, at this moment, cannot support much more of 
a fiscal burden. 
The only virtual opposition to FODEA came from the state-
owned banks. They argued that the losses from prolonged res-
cheduled repayments at low interest rates will greatly affect 
their liquidity and financial strength and endanger the national-
ized banks. An analysis of the possible financial effects of 
FODEA for the case of the Banco Nacional (BNCR) is presented in 
Annex 1. It shows the possible interest-revenue losses (or 
gains), the gain from recovering the totality of the loans, and 
the liquidity losses of not recovering any loans during the first 
four years. 
Since the banks did not present any actual figures on the 
possible effects of this law, when they defended their possition 
at the Congress' hearings, their arguments were not taken much 
into account by the Congressmen. Actually, the bank officers' 
attitude became, after a while, one of abdication. Since they 
knew that the law would be approved, they lobbied for higher 
interest rates and shorter maturity terms, in order to minimize 
their losses. 
In the aftermath of FODEA, the banks also attempted to 
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minimize their losses, through the selling to the Government of 
the worst-quality loans in their portfolio. These were the loans 
that had already been transferred to their lost-loans account. 
They hoped to keep the best-quality loans for rescheduling 
purposes. The banks also tried to assure the collection of the 
rescheduled loans by asking for additional collateral on each 
loan to the farmers, slowing down the rescheduling process in the 
meantime. Cattle producers protested angrily for these actions. 
They even stopped the supply of meat for about a week in January, 
until the Government, through the MAG, pressured the banks to 
accept small and medium farmers without asking for any papers, 
just their identification card. Large cattle raisers did not 
obtain much from this negotiation, except for a statement from 
the banks that they would expedite the process. 
Small-farmer organizations have also had some confrontations 
with the banks in the aftermath of FODEA, especially regarding 
the interpretation of some provisions of the law that affect 
small farmers. For example, the banks interpreted the grace 
period to begin at the time when that the law was enacted, while 
the small farmers argued that it should start after the loan is 
rescheduled. The small farmers threatened to block roads and the 
supply of products to the cities, if the banks did not stop 
putting obstacles to the implementation of the law. The banks, 
on the other hand, argued that they had done as much as possible 
to speed up the process, and that if roughly one-half of the 
outstanding loans had not been rescheduled, this was due to the 
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lack of interest on the part of the farmers. Indeed, some 
farmers have been waiting for the full pardon of their debt. 
Some opposition to the FODEA law came from the small-farmer 
groups, specially their sponsor in Congress, Congressman Brenes 
Castillo, regarding the concentration of the loan portfolio that 
qualified under the debt relief program. The arguments were that 
with this law large farmers benefited much more than the smaller 
ones, because of the great proportion of the l~an portfolio that 
they represented. 
As can be seen in Table 1, around 83 percent of the number 
of operations that qualified for rescheduling in the BNCR were 
those of small farmers, while they only accounted for 27 percent 
of the total amount. At the other end, large farmers represented 
5 percent of the total number of operations, but 44 percent of 
the total amount. If only the Juntas Rural es, which included 
6,859 operations for 222 million colones, are considered, "true" 
small farmers would account for only 8. 4 percent of the total 
amount and 55 percent of the total number of operations. 
Actually, according to the Central Bank, the definition of a 
small farmer, in order to qualify for the subsidized rate of the 
Juntas Rural es differs from that used in the FODEA law. The 
definition of the Central Bank considers as a small farmer an 
operator who has no more than 800,000 colones in debt, while 
FODEA has an upper limit of 1.5 million colones. The concentra-
tion figures seem to be more significant if one takes into 
account that larger farmers tend to have more than one operation, 
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while smaller farmers usually have only one operation with the 
bank. 
Given this concentration, the benefits that each individual 
will get would be much larger if he is large farmer than a small 
one. For instance, a large farmer from the Banco Nacional would 
receive, on average, an interest subsidy of about 121.040 
colones, while small farmers would receive, on average, 7, 222 
colones.Y 
2- Reformas a la Ley Organica del Banco Central y del Sistema 
Bancario Nacional. 
This project contained three distinct parts. The first one 
included reforms to the Banking System Law, the second one 
reformed the Central Bank Law, and the last part gave more powers 
to the Audi toria General de Bancos. The Bill was expected to 
allow the state-owned banks to compete more effectively with the 
private commercial banks. The bill recognized that, in order to 
achieve economic growth, a modern and efficient financial system 
is necessary. This bill primarily exempted banks from the laws 
about the Autoridad Presupuestaria and Eguilibrio Financiero del 
Sector PUblico. The bill was presented to Congress by the 
Executive branch of Government, with the support of the Central 
Bank and the Banco Nacional. 
The bill was approved by the Economics Commission and was 
waiting to be studied by the floor of Congress (Plenario). In 
early March, however, the Government presented an alternative 
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project, with basically the same ideas, but much narrower in 
scope, in order to expedite the enactment of the law, needed to 
stabilize the financial system, in view of the recent bankruptcy 
of several private financieras. 
3- Law to Establish Appropiate Interest Rates for Agricultural 
Loans. 
This bill 
proposed that 
was presented by congressman Munoz Bustos. 
the interest rate for agricultural loans 
It 
be 
established during a period of five years at the Libor rate plus 
three percentage points. The argument given was that the cost of 
money is too high in Costa Rica at this moment, and that the 
agricultural sector cannot survive such high interest rates. 
The state-owned banks expressed their opposition to this 
project, arguing that the establishment of the interest rates is 
a matter for the Central Bank, and that the cost of money should 
reflect the cost of funds and intermediation costs. The bill, 
they argued, a1so violated the autonomy of bank administration. 
Dr. Miguel A. Rodriguez, now a candidate for the primary 
elections for President in the PUSC, was invited to comment on 
the project. He gave a lengthy explanation on how the cost of 
money is determined on the basis of intermediation costs, the 
inflation rate, and the demand for resources by the Government, 
in order to cover the fiscal deficit. Even though Congressman 
Munoz Bustos was convinced by the technical arguments of Dr. 
Rodriguez, he insisted that the agricultural sector needs low 
16 
interest rates to survive. He then proposed to change the bill 
in order to tie the interest rate to the deposit rate charged by 
banks. 
In order to alleviate the burden of bills to be examined by 
the Agricultural Commission and speed up the process, this 
project was approved in commi tte, but without the vote of the 
Commission's President, Jorge Rossi, who did not consider it a 
solution to the problem. It has little chances of approval by 
the floor (Plenari9) in its present form. 
4- LaW for th@ Financing Qf the Small Farmer. 
This bill was proposed by Congressman Avila Sole. Due to 
the decline of small-farmer credit volumes, and given the 
importance of small farmers to the democratic life of Costa Rica, 
this bill attempted to reverse this decline by forcing the state-
owned banks to lend at least 10 percent of their portfolio to 
small farmers. 
Opposition to this project came from the state-owned banks, 
as well as from some Congressmen, who argued that this was not a 
solution to the problem. The banks do not have an incentive to 
lend to small farmers, and forcing them to do so will not make 
them lend more. In any case, bank directors are responsible for 
their actions at the bank, by law. Forcing them to lend too much 
to risky enterprises that makes them lose money will put them in 
an impossible situation. 
This bill was also approved by the Agricultural Commission, 
.. 17 
without much discussion, just to speed up the process. Again, it 
is unlikely that it will be approved by the Plenario. 
5- Ley de Fideicomiso Agrario. 
This bill is the initiative of Congressman Jorge Rossi, with 
the help of the Banco Nacional. It was presented to Congress by 
Rossi together with Congressmen Corrales Bolanos and Arias 
Angulo. The bill gives support to the Land Reform Institute of 
Costa Rica (IDA) in its land distribution efforts. It states 
that it wants to take advantage of the good will of some lan-
downers to sell their land, so that the state-owned banks may 
distribute this land among small and medium farmers. The banks, 
at the same time, would grant loans to help the new owners start 
production, and be able to pay the loan to purchase the land. 
The program is based on the design of the Fideicomiso de 
Vivienda, which has been in place at the Banco Nacional since 
1979. This bill authorizes the state-owned banks to take 
possession of the land given as collateral by its defaulting 
clients, and then sell this foreclosed land to small and medium 
farmers. These will receive, in turn, credit to pay for the 
land, which is also pledged as collateral for the loan. 
The president of the Agricultural Commission, Congressman 
Rossi, is very interested in this bill. He even had some 
preliminary conversations with IDA's executive president, Sergio 
Quiros, who agreed with the purpose of the bill and promised to 
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help. When Congress asked IDA for its evaluation of the bill, 
however, IDA's Board of Directors, in absence of its President, 
gave a negative report on the bill and argued that the banks did 
not have the capacity to undertake land distributions, which 
was, in any case, a task assigned to IDA. Further talks between 
Rossi and IDA's president induced this institution to reverse its 
initial negative report. The new position indicated that IDA 
would be willing to cooperate with the banks with technical 
assistance on the distribution of land. 
6- Creation of a Small-Farmer Credit Department. 
Given the importance of small farmers to the democratic life 
of Costa Rica, the positive experience of the Juntas Rurales at 
the Banco Nacional, and the previous experience of institutions 
that were created through the Banco Nacional, such as the Central 
Bank, the Consejo Nacional de Producci6n, and INFOCOOP, the MAG 
considered it desirable to present a project that would create a 
more specialized and independent department than the present 
Departamento de Credito Rural, to be called Departamento del 
Pequeno Productor Agropecuario. 
This department would have complete administrative and 
functional autonomy from the BNCR, with its own accounting system 
and Board of Directors. The Banco Nacional 's executive presi-
dent, the department's manager, and one member appointed by the 
executive and elected from the national organizations of small 
farmers, will form the Board of Directors. 
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The state-owned banks would sell their entire small-farmer 
credit portfolios to this department, in exchange for certifi-
cates of deposit at an interest rate of 8 percent. The Ministry 
of Finance would also give the department one billion colones in 
bonds, which would be used to finance its operations, in addition 
to any foreign loans and certificates of deposit that it may 
obtain. 
The main supporter of this bill in Congress is Congressman 
Rossi, but not with the same interest as the previously discussed 
bill. Some of the other Congressmen on the Agricultural Commis-
sion, however, do not know much about it, and did not see the 
need for it, since they consider that the Juntas Rurales will 
lose a lot of economies of scale and of scope if they are 
separated from the BNCR. 
7- Other. 
There were two additional projects related to agricultural 
credit under study in Congress, but with little or no chance of 
been approved. One was a bill presented by the left-wing 
Congressman Solis Herrera, called Ley de Emergencia Agraria. It 
stated that due to the extreme dependence of the Costa Rican 
economy on international financial organizations, and the deep 
crisis that the country is in, the agricultural sector should be 
protected and promoted. 
The bill would force landowners to use their land in 
production, or otherwise the IDA would be authorized to rent that 
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land to small-farmers who will work it. It would also require 
the MAG to establish quantitative limits (topes) on agricultural 
credit every year. 
Nacional Campgsino, 
It would 
composed of 
create, as well, 
13 members of 
the Consejo 
small-farmer 
organizations, from which the nation's President should choose at 
least three members to belong to the state-owned banks' Boards of 
Directors. 
This bill received several negative reports from the banks, 
which argued that the intrusion that this law would create in the 
functions of the banks is excessive, and that it would increase 
the politization of the Board of Directors. 
The last one was a bill presented by Congressman Corrales 
~olaftos, as Ley de Emisi6n d9 Bong§ para el Desarrollo Agrario. 
This project was designed to give financial support to IDA, by 
authorizing it to issue 7 billion colones in public debt bonds, 
with a maturity of 20 years and at an interest rate equal to the 
deposit rate of the banking system. The bill generated negative 
reactions from all banks, and even from IDA, which considered 
that the issue of bonds is a function of the banks. The bill has 
little or no chance of been approved, since it was in the 
Agricultural Commission for more than a year, without having been 
s.tudied. 
IIl. pglitical Pressure on the Banks 
Besides the political pressure exerted by interest groups on 
Congress to pass laws that allow them to obtain additional 
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benefits from the Nationalized Banking System, there are added 
pressures on the banks themselves by these groups and by 
influential politicians, either directly, or through the Central 
Bank and the Executive branch of Government. 
For instance, some individuals, because of their political 
power, may obtain credit with special conditions, such as low 
interest rates, long maturity terms, high debt-to-assets ratios, 
and a fast loan processing time. This does not apply only to 
influential politicians, but also to friends of any Board 
Director, or large clients of the bank. 
This type of influence, however, is not too widespread, 
according to most of the bank-related people who were inter-
viewed. This may be because, on the one hand, individuals may 
not have enough political clout, by themselves, to control the 
Board of Directors and top management of a bank. On the other 
hand, banks have instruments to avoid some undesired political 
clients, such as delaying the disbursement of the loan, or by 
asking for additional requirements that make approval of the loan 
difficult. 
One of the interviewees, however, expressed the feeling that 
the political clout of small groups of very influential politi-
cians might be very strong in the banking system. These small 
groups, which act inside the political parties, are formed mainly 
around former presidents and presidential candidates. In order 
to further investigate this hypothesis, the concentration of the 
credit portfolio of the state-owned banks could be studied, not 
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operation by operation, but by individuals and related firms. 
For instance, it was determined, after a more thorough examina-
tion of the arrears portfolio of the BNCR that qualified for the 
FODEA law, that among the about 640 operations that conformed the 
large agricultural loans, there were only about 200 different 
names of individuals or firms. Some of these, moreover, may be 
closely related (e.g., husband and wife). 
Individuals may not have enough power to influence the banks 
by themselves, but when organized in groups with a common cause, 
their ability to exert pressure is increased greatly. In Costa 
Rica, pressure groups organized by product, i.e. coffee, cattle, 
sugar cane, grains, and so on, seem to be more efficient than 
individuals in obtaining special conditions from the state-owned 
banks. 
These groups may exert direct pressure on the Board of 
Directors in order to obtain special conditions, but this may not 
be effective unless there is at least one member of the group in 
the Board, to represent their interests. For this reason, groups 
attempt to influence, instead, the Consejo de Gobierno (Cabinet), 
which appoints the members of the state owned banks' Boards. 
since there is the equivalent of an employee relationship between 
the Consej o and the banks, the later are used many times as a 
socio-political instrument of the Government. For instance, many 
bank employees admitted that the banks lend as little as they can 
to small-farmers at subsidized rates (Juntas Rurales) , except 
when they feel that the dissatisfaction among small-farmers 
• 
• 23 
against the Government is mounting and getting to be too high. 
Then, they open the line of credit for this group, as a escape 
valve, to alleviate the pressure. 
In exerting this kind of pressure, the groups that belong to 
producers of seasonal crops, such as grains, will have more 
clout, since all the members of the group will need credit at the 
same time. Producers of coffee, bananas, or cattle will not be 
as efficient in exerting pressure, in this case, since their 
needs for credit are not as seasonal as for grains. 
Groups may also exert pressure through the Executive branch, 
in order to obtain a decree that favors their particular inter-
ests. An example of this is the series of decrees issued by 
former president Monge during the last year of his mandate, by 
which cattle production was declared under a state of emergency, 
and a rescheduling of the loans for this activity was ordered. 
The effect of this decrees, however, was minimal, since the banks 
never rescheduled the loans as ordered. This may have led, in 
the end, to the serach for legislative action and the passage of 
the FODEA law. 
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Notes: 
* Luis Mesalles is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Agricul-
tural Economics at the Ohio State University. Research for this 
paper was sponsored by the Project on Policy Tools for Rural 
Finance in Costa Rica, financed by the USAID Mission in San Jose, 
as part of the cooperative agreement between AID, Science and 
Technology Division, and the Ohio State University on Experimen-
tal Approaches to Rural Savings. The author assumes respon-
sability for the contents of the paper, which do no necessarily 
represent the views of AID. 
l/ See Tomas Miller, "Costa Rica: El Debate Politico en el Sector 
Agropecuario," in this collection of papers, for a description of 
several groups and associations created to lobby for the farmers' 
interests. 
V These small-farmer associations are now grouped, with the 
Camara de Granos BAsicos, into the Union Nacional del Sector 
Aqropecuario (UNSA), and are represented in Congress by an 
independent Congressman, Brenes Castillo. See Tomas Miller's 
paper in this collection. 
11 Given that the average loan size for large farmers is 1,868,-
000 colones, and the average interest rate is 21.48 percent, 
large farmers receive a subsidy in interest rate of: 
1,868,000 * (0.2148 - 0.15 ). 
The average loan size of small farmers is 67562 colones and 
the average interest rate is 18.69 percent. 
,• 
• 
" .
.. 
25 
ANNEX 1 
Approximate Financial Effects of FODEA on the Banco Nacional 
1- Annual interest revenue losses. 
The bank loses some interest revenue from having to forego 
the contractual interest on small and medium loans, which on the 
average is at present 19. 9 percent, and instead receive only 8 
percent of interest from the Government bonds. Additionaly, the 
bank has to reschedule large-farmer loans at 15 percent, while it 
had expected to receive an average of 21.5 percent of interest. 
on the other hand, the bank will be receiving for sure the 
interest from the bonds, while part of the interest revenues from 
the delinquent loans would have not been received. 
The annual interest revenue, during the first four years, 
from the Government bonds and the rescheduling of large-farmer 
loans would be (in millions of colones): 
small and medium farmers: 1,494.9 * 0.08 = 119.6 
Large farmers: 1,165.6 * 0.15 = 174.8 
Total Interest from FODEA 294.4 
The total interest revenue that the banks would have 
received, if they would had collected the totallity of the 
interest from the loans that were on arrears, would have been 548 
million colones. As a result, the annual loss would be 253. 6 
million colones. If the banks would have received 75 percent of 
that interest, then the loss would be 116. 6 million colones, 
while with a 50 percent recovery rate, the bank would gain, 
instead, 20.4 million colones. 
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2- Default Losses: 
There are gains from collecting the totallity of the loans 
in sixteen years, against the possibility of not collecting all 
of it without FODEA. The bank, by selling the small and medium 
farmer loan portfolio to the Government, is receiving an "as-
surance" that it will recover 100 percent of this portfolio. If, 
instead, the bank had to attempt to recover these loans under the 
normal bank guidelines, part of that would have never been 
collected. Because of the lack of information at the bank, it 
was not possible to find out a good estimate of how much of the 
portfolio would have been recovered. Some bank officers es-
timated that the recovery rate would be around 50-60 percent, 
while other estimated it to be much lower than that. 
Table A.l. Net Gains from Selling the BNCR's Small and 
Medium Farmer Portfolio. 
If the bank would 
have collected 
(Percentages) 
100 
75 
50 
30 
20 
It would have 
received 
(Million colones) 
1,494.9 
1,121.2 
747.5 
439.5 
299.0 
Net Gains 
from FODEA 
(Million colones) 
0 
353.7 
747.4 
1,055.4 
1,195.9 
Source: Computed by the author from unpublished BNCR data. 
The gains are inflated, however, by the inflation effect. 
If the bank would have been able to recover at least part of the 
... 
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portfolio in four or five years, the present value of what the 
bank receives would not have lost as much value as the Government 
bonds, from which the bank does not receive anything until the 
fifth year, and it does not receive the totallity of it until the 
sixteenth year. In real terms, therefore, the bank will lose 
part of the purchasing power of the principal. Moreover, the 
interest rate on the rescheduled loans is lower than the expected 
rate of inflation, so the bank cannot use interest payments to 
avoid this erosion of its portfolio. 
3- Liquidity losses. 
There is a loss for the bank for not receiving any amortiza-
tion on the bonds until the fourth year, as compared to what the 
bank would have been able to collect directly from the borrowers, 
including the large farmers. This lack of loanable funds will 
strain the liquidity position of the bank. For instance, the 
bank might have collected 100 percent of the total portfolio 
during the first four years, while with FODEA it will fail to 
receive those 2,660.6 million colones in funds, because of the 
grace period. The assumption of the bank being able to collect 
the totality of the portfolio in four years is not realistic, 
however. 
28 
Table A.2 BNCR. Liquidity Losses During Fodea's Grace 
Period. 
If the bank would 
have collected 
(Percentages) 
100 
75 
50 
30 
20 
It would have 
received 
(Million colones) 
2,660.6 
1,995.5 
1,330.3 
798.2 
532.1 
Net Loss of Liquidity 
with FODEA 
(Million colones) 
2,660.6 
1,995.5 
1,330.3 
798.2 
532.1 
Source: Computed by the author from unpublished BNCR data. 
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